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FOREWARD 
This case study was developed as a vehicle for class exposure to 
and discussion of actual management problems. It is not intended to 
illustrate either effective and ineffective management practices. Nor 
should this case be viewed in any sense as a research report. Rather, 
the intent is to provide the actual information that was available to a 
firm's management on a particular problem situation. 
LANDMARK, INC. (B) 
As the manager of the young and growing foods division of Landmark, 
Inc., a regional farm cooperative headquartered in Columbus, Ohio, John 
Schmidt was enthusiastic about the growth and future potential of the divi-
sion, yet concerned about several critical decisions confronting him in 
1971. With strong support from their Board of Directors, Landmark had 
moved rather rapidly into food marketing during the past five years. By 
1971, the cooperative had become a major factor in egg processing and mar-
keting in Ohio; was selling and distributing some fresh poultry; and held a 
51% interest in two Farm and Dairy Stores--a possible convenience store 
chain in the embrionic stage. Since the Farm and Dairy Stores were managed 
by the minority partner, John's division was largely concerned about mar-
keting poultry products, particularly eggs. 
Landmark's entrance into egg marketing had come largely via acquisi-
tion of other cooperatives. Because of the rate of acquisitions and because 
several organizations were involved, John felt his division needed time to 
digest and evaluate their egg operations. However, because of the differ-
ences in the accounting systems of the various cooperatives acquired, it 
was difficult to merge operating and financial reports. In many cases, the 
data that John felt was needed for adequate controls and planning were just 
not available. Still he knew that several decisions had to be made in the 
near future; and that his boss, Bill McGreevy would be expecting some infor-
mation of the intermediate range direction and strategy for the egg marketing 
operations. Should they expand further? Should some of their plants and 
distribution centers be closed or relocated? On what type of customers 
should they concentrate? What was the "best" basis for pricing eggs at dif-
ferent points in the marketing channel? Could they continue to serve small 
egg producers who were members of the cooperatives and yet be as efficient 
as their competitors? These were some of the decisions pressing upon John 
and his staff. 
Background 
In the middle fifties, several independent egg processing and marketing 
cooperatives operated within the state of Ohio. Due to their small size, 
potential scale economies were not realized. Considerable difficulty was 
also experienced in trying to balance the supply of eggs from producers 
(which fluctuated) with the needs of customers. Realizing their individual 
problems, six of these cooperatives formed a federated egg marketing coopera-
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tive to sell surpluses occurring in the various egg plants. The Federated 
Egg Cooper.ative thus came into being. It was felt that this type of arrange-
ment would give each of the six processors an outlet for excess production 
and that between them, Federated Egg would get a fairly constant supply of 
eggs. 
By the middle sixties, however, the six cooperatives were again faced 
with changes in the nature of competition. Several large feed companies, 
actively competing for bus1ness, had encouraged larger egg producers to 
enter into contract arrangements. The contracts generally provided the 
feed manufacturer with the option of controlling the sale of eggs produced. 
~~ile many of these producers continued to market their eggs through the 
co-ops, the contracts put the feed manufacturers in a much stronger posi-
tion of control, and in turn placed a higher degree of vulnerability on 
each co-op for a dependable source of supply. -
Contract arrangements had rapidly gained in popularity during the early 
sixties. By the mid-sixties, nearly one-half of the eggs supplied to the 
co-ops were produced under contract with feed manufacturers. This situation 
posed e significant threat to the co-ops, since the feed companies could 
choose to direct these eggs to other processors or even to build competing 
processing plants of their own. 
Another problem of increasing magnitude was the prominent and powerful 
position held by large egg buyers. The small, specialized egg marketing 
cooperatives felt they were at a definite disadvantage in short-term mar-
keting tactics. When a small co-op depended heavily on any one chain store 
buyer, that co-op was in a very vulnerable position. The switching of this 
one buyer to another supplier could literally put a small processing opera-
tion out of business. Thus, the processing cooperatives felt threatened 
from both sides of the marketing chain, largely because of inadequate size 
and market power. 
To remain competitive, the egg processing cooperatives felt compelled 
to integrate further into the system. One alternative was to start their 
own feed business and contract with producers to assure a supply of eggs. 
\~ile such a move would alleviate some of their supply problems, there was 
a question whether the individual cooperatives had adequate size to support 
an efficient feed operation; further, such a move did little to reduce their 
vulnerability in marketing eggs. Another alternative was to merge with an 
ongoing feed and contracting operation. 
In early 1966, the Columbiana egg pr~cessing co-op (a member of Feder-
ated Egg) approached Landmark and offered them the opportunity of purchasing 
their egg operation. The offer provided an opportunity for Landmark. who 
was already heavily involved in the feed business, including some contract-
ing with egg producers, to integrate forward into egg processing. 
Landmark signed a purchase agreement with the Columbiana plant in early 
1966. Almost immediately thereafter, Landmark was approached by three other 
members of the Federated Egg marketing group. The Napoleon, New Washington, 
and Wooster cooperatives all saw the logic of the Columbiana co-op's move 
and likewise offered to sell to Landmark. Landmark acquired the three addi-
tional plants during the 1966-69 period. 
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Gaining title to four of the six processors who had formed Federated 
Egg also gave Landmark control over Federated's marketing operation. At 
the suggestion of the two remaining processors, Landmark acquired full 
ownership of Federated in 1969. In total, the operations purchased by 
Landm~rk consisted of four egg processing plants, an egg breaking plant, 
a~u four sales and distribution centers in Cleveland, Columbus, Pittsburgh, 
a~"H1 Narietta. 
Landmark's Feed Operations 
As a regional cooperative, Landmark serviced 72 local Landmark coopera-
tives, which in turn operated approximately 180 retail service outlets. Up 
until 1965, all feed was sold through the local cooperatives. The growing 
insistence of large producers for direct delivery of feed from the mill, 
thereby eliminating the costs and profit of local retail service outlets, 
caused a reappraisal of feed distribution policies. In 1965, Landmark 
started ~~s~ributing feed direct to some of the large producers. 
In 1967, Landmark bought Gold Star Feeds in Wooster, Ohio, which was 
heavily involved in contracting with poultry producers. This operation was 
maintained as a separate part of the Landmark Feed Division and was used to 
supply all direct delivered feed, and all contract producers. 
By 1971, Gold Star supplied the egg producers under contract (about 1 
million layers), plus many additional producers. The eggs produced under 
contract were not necessarily marketed through Landmark's foods division 
although the newer contracts being signed provided this additional aspect 
of control. Some of the newer contracts stipulated that Landmark, Inc. 
maintained ownership of the birds, supplied the feed, controlled flock 
management practices, and marketed the eggs. The individual producers 
largely supplied the facilities and labor under contract terms.1 
Thus, in 1971, the foods division was moving toward captive suppliers 
of eggs, yet was still considerably short of that. The division handled 
eggs from about 2 million layers, some of which were under contract with 
Gold Star Feed, some under contract with other feed manufacturers, and some 
under no contract. 
Competitive Situation 
John estimated there were 30 egg processing plants operating within 
the state as of 1971. These were operated by about 25 different firms, only 
three of which were cooperatives. The majority of these handled fresh eggs. 
There were also some processors dealing only with breaking and ungraded eggs 
for commercial use in fresh, dehydrated or frozen form. 
1contract provisions varied. The producer normally received a minimum 
of 10% of the value of eggs produced plus the profits from the flock when 
they were sold at the end of the laying period. Some contracts called for 
12% or 17% of the egg check with the profits from the sale of layers split 
between producers and Landmark. Three basic types of contracts are summar-
ized in Exhibit 6. 
Zs~:i.natc::d fit,·1-:ces for 1970 indicated that Ohio producers satisfied 
cbcu·:: t~;rc,·-tr:i n:1.t: of tl-::e C(. tal C(msumption of eggs in Ohio. Ohio egg pro-
ce.ss;;rs .J..::«':IG:r·ted o;t;e-half of the total eggs they processed--largely 
fron western £~~ sou~hern stEtes. 
2.1 billion 
Eggs mar~eted direct 0.3 billion 
Ohio ?roducec eggs ma~k2ted throu~h Ohio processors • 1.8 billion 
Total eggs processed by Ohio egg processing plants. 3.4 - 4.1 billion 
Proport:1on cf Ohio egg ?rocessor output sold in Ohio •. 75 - 80 percent 
Total ;;;:gg, cch'lsumption in Ohio . • • • 3. 2 billion 
Source: Direct from producers • 0.3 billion 
From egg processors • • 2.9 billion 
(2.6 billion shell eggs and 0.3 billion in processed form) 
While Ohio egg processors supplied most of the eggs consumed in Ohio, 
this varied ~orne depending upon supply conditions. During periods of sur-
plus production, eggs from the south or mld-west were sometimes shipped into 
Ohio markets at slightly over breaker prices. causing serious competition 
and consternation for Landtnark and other Ohio processors. 
Landma.rk v1a.s the largest egg processor in the state, accounting for 
about 8 of the state's egg processing business. Two other Ohio egg 
processors were very close to Landmark in volume. One of these, Poultry 
Producers Cooperative, was the other major cooperative operation. This co-
op had its center of operation in the west-central portion of the state (See 
Figure 1). ~tile it sometimes co~peted for sales with Landmark, Poultry 
Producers sold a high proportion of its eggs to the Cincinnati, Dayton, and 
RLchmond, Indiana markets which were not prime markets for Landmark eggs. 
Up until 1969, Poultry Producers haci owned 49 percent of Federated 
Egg. At that time, Landmark bought out theic interest in Federated, but 
agreed to continue to market Poultry Producers' surplus eggs. 
At different times during the past few months, the management and board 
of Landmark had considered the possibility of merging with Poultry Producers. 
The two organizations were on friendly terms, but the specific advantages and 
disadvantages of such a merger were difficult to assess. Although neither 
company had formally contacted the other about a merger, it was felt that 
both organizations would at least be receptive to a proposal and would give 
it serious consideration. 
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Two facts were in general agreement. If the merger were to occur, it 
would make the resulting combine the fifth largest egg processor in the 
nation. Merger would thus make both concerns less vulnerable to the loss 
of any large account. 
Secondly, such a merger would reduce the two cooperatives to one, not 
only in fact, but also in the eyes of retail buyers. From past experience, 
John and his staff knew that chain organizations were reluctant to tie them-
selves to only one supplier. Would such a merger reduce the total business 
that the two cooperatives now held as separate and competing entities? 
As John analyzed the accounts being served by Landmark, he found that 
only one 80-store chain was being aupplied by both cooperatives. However, 
he also realized that if an account became dissatisfied with one of the 
co-ops and cancelled them as a supplier, the present arrangement allowed 
the other co-op to try to pick up the business. This would not be so likely 
if the two organizations merged. 
Relationships with Egg Producers 
Another question gaining importance in the Landmark operation concerned 
changing producer relationships. Because of the high cost of assembling 
and handling eggs from small producers, John and his staff had encouraged 
the plants to gradually raise the minimum number of cases required for eggs 
to be picked up at the farm. The various plant managers, however, held dif-
ferent views on such restrictions. The result was considerable variance in 
the average size of producers supplying the different plants. 
ine prices paid to producers reflected the lower cost of serving large 
producers. The price schedule used in 1970 was as follows: 
Volume Per Week Price Basis 
A Under 25 2 cases Farm run (ungraded) 
B 25 to 49 cases Farm price (graded) 
c 50 to 300 cases Farm price (graded) + 2¢ 
D Over 300 cases Farm price (graded) + 2 1/2¢ 
The farm price was established for each processing plant area, using 
U1·ner Barry prices, plus information from the individual plant managers on 
local market conditions, John was not: particularly happy with the use of 
Urner Barry prices as a benchmark since t.bey reflected the market for a 
2Farm run (ungraded) price was determined by management judgment to 
approximate the price of a fairly typical small lot of low quality eggs. 
The intent was to discourage small producers. In practice, the price dif-
ference from farm price (graded) varied according to supply conditions. 
When prices were low, there was little if any price difference since manage-
ment felt producers were already being hurt. 
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&mall sltare of the egga ~arketed in the u.s. 3 However, until a better pri-
cing ~ase was developed, he felt it was the best available. Producers were 
pald once a week. 
The concerted move to discourage small producers resulted in the average 
size producer tripling ~n just two years, from 30 cases per week in 1968 to 
90 c3~eo per week in 1970, and the number of producers being cut nearly in 
half. Howevec, t~is act~on also posed some potential problems. Some of 
the small producers wer~ ol~-time members of Landmark who produced eggs on 
a quasi-hobby bas~s. S~me h&d also been instrumental in organizing the ori-
ginal egg ptocessin~ coo~~~o:lve~. Botn ~ohn and Bill McGreevy recognized 
that some sm~ll egg J=onucE:s ~ig~t be sizeable accounts for other divisions 
of Lancn.ark. Refuo~r-J to ha~dle ch0ir egg oasiness might result in losing 
the]r fertilizer, feed, ~r ~st:cleuF busiuess. ~t the same time, however, 
John and Bill agreed thot in order to ~ompete with other large egg proces-
sor~ in the tightly coordinated egg ~ys=em of tl1e future, they had to con-
tinue their emphasis on laTge produceTs. 
John felt they should he setting minimum acceptable ~eekly case levels, 
but di~ not Know how high they should be. The average size of egg producers 
had been increasing so rapidly in recent years that whatever limit was made, 
it would probaoly have to be revised upward over time. Each time the lower 
limit was chan~ed, it might generate adverse fa~er reaction. 
One alternative thac had been tried to some extent was to reflect the 
diseconomies of servicing small producers through the prices paid for their 
eggs, plus a charge for farm pick-up. However, fully reflecting the added 
costs of servicing small producers might require so large a differential 
that producer dissatisfaction would be as great as dropping them altogether. 
Size and Location of Plants 
After discussing the situation with his staff, John recommended that 
the New Washington plant be closed. This was effected in January~ 1971, 
and its processing volume transferred to the Napoleon (N.W.) plant. This 
left the foods division with three shell egg processing plants located at 
Napoleon (NW Ohio), Wooster (North Central Ohio), and Columbiana (NE Ohio). 
The Columbiana plant also had an egg breaking and freezing operation. The 
present location of Landmark and major competing plants are shown in Figure 1. 
3urner Barry is a private price reporting service based in New York City. 
Originally, only NYC prices were reported. However, as the petcentage of 
eggs marketed through New York continually declined, the sample was broadened. 
Prices are now collected from a non-random sample of large egg producers and 
processors in different parts of the country. 
4By mid-1971, Landmark was being supplied by approximately 250 producers. 
About 30 of these produced less than 25 cases per week; another 5 produced 
over 25 but less than 50 cases per week. Many of these small producers were 
served by the Wooster plant. 
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FIGURE 1: Location of Ohio's Major Egg Processors 
0 Landmark Plants 
X Major Competitive Plants 
-- Other Co-operative Plants 
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The three pla:ats operated with tne following equipment and shift sche-
du.lee: 
Napoleon (m-J)--3 egg process.L.ng machines--1 work shift/day 
Woogter (NC)--1 egg processing machine--2 work shifts/day 
Columbiana (NE)--2 egg processing machines--! 1/2 work shifts/day 
Each machine was capable of processing about 2,000 cases of eggs per 
week per shift. John estim<El,ted that a t~N'o machine plant operating two 
shifts per day represented the optimum oneration (8,000 cases per week). 
However~ this depended upon oti1er factors such as size and density of pro-
ducers (tV'hich affected assembly costs). distribution costs, etc. Figures 2 
and 3 indicate the den&ity of egg production in various Ohio counties in 
1964. 
Marketing Situation 
In 1970, Landmark processed 1,06~,900 cases of eggs. The source of 
eggs foT the different plants, and the volume processed by various plants 
was as follows: 
Thousands of Cases Received From Cases Gain or % Gain or 
Producers Transfers Other Total Sold (Loss) (Loss) 
NW Plant 301.2 3.4 45.7 350.3 342.5 (6.0) (1. 7) 
NE Plant 179.7 22.1 101.3 303.1 299.2 (2.0) (0. 7) 
Wooster Plant 178.4 15.2 68.1 261.7 261.0 (0.7) (0.3) 
N. Central Plant 103.7 3.8 43.4 150.9 149.7 (1.3) (0.8) 
Total 763.0 44.4 258.5 1065.9 1052.3 (10.0) (1.0) 
The one million cases of eggs processed by the 
of in the following ways: 
four plants were disposed 
Sold through sales and distribution centers: 5 
41.0 
• • • • 310.8 
51.1 
Columbus . 
Cleveland ••••• 
Marietta • 
Total 
Transferred to frozen food plant 
for breaking and freezing. . • • • • • • • • 
Sold by sales offices at pro-
402.9 (38%) 
61.3 (6%) 
cessing plants • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 588.1 (56%) 
5the Pittsburgh distribution center was closed in October, 1969, since 
the Columbiana plant and sales personnel could more efficiently service 
this market. 
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• 
SVTI..ER 
• HAMil.. TON 
FIGURE 2: Number of Chickens Fow- Months Old or Older on Farms, 1964 
Each • = 100, 000 or major part thereof 
Source: U. 8. Census 
• 
• 
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WILL AM:!\ f'Ul.. TO~>~ LUC./il.S 
t1 I b~ ,:r t~ r I ;J.I i:/i5 ,. ("""' 
Of: I" I ANCf: 1;~/)r.. 
"' 7 79 
~WtCA 
HANCOCK Jijp,7i.f 
1 I .l- 2- COSHOCTON 
[JARKf. t.(;J 
--41 I( 1 ' r l..IC.KI!;!Go MIAMI I:U:LMON, 
~q;' MU5KIN(;UM 
FIGURE 3: Sale of Eggs by County in Thousand Dozens, 1964 
(State Total 166,860,976 dozen) 
Source: U. S. Census 
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John esti~ated that 65 percent of their volume was sold to retail food 
stores, 10 percent to the institutional trade, and 25 percent to wholesale 
egg distributors. 
The distribution of eggs from the four processing plants to the three 
sales and distribution centers and the frozen food plant are shown in Exhibit 
1. As can be noted, the Cleveland sales office handled nearly three-fourths 
of the eggs marketed through these departments and about 30 percent of all 
eggs processed by the Landmark plants. In part, this was due to the sales 
personnel in the Cleveland division who had developed an effective program 
to assist retailers in generating more sales and gross profit from their 
dairy departments. This frequently involved a reduction in the number of 
items carried in the department, reallocation of display space, and more 
logical grouping of items within the department. 
Exhibit 2 presents fairly typical operating results for a retail dairy 
department. While eggs frequently did not carry a high gross margin, they 
were very strong generators of profit per foot of shelf space because of 
their high inventory turnover. Efforts directed at increasing department 
profits by giving more space to the more profitable items, and less to the 
least profitable items generally resulted in the display--and sale--of eggs 
being expanded. This approach was favorably received by retail firms since 
dairy department sales and gross profits generally increased. and also pro-
vided benefits to Landmark. 
The experience of the co-op in the Cleveland market convinced John and 
his staff that this was an effective method of selling eggs on a basis other 
than price. Their present merchandising approach to retailers included the 
proposition that if eggs were given 10 percent of the display space, they 
would contribute 20 percent of the sales and 25 percent of the gross profit 
in the dairy department. John recognized, however, that not all of their 
sales personnel could effectively work with retailers. Many were still 
oriented towards "selling eggs 11 , rather than marketing or merchandising 
eggs. Many were clearly not retailer oriented. 
Most of the eggs sold by Landmark were packed in retailer cartons. The 
foods division had recently developed a new styrofoam carton with the brand 
name Lovin' Eggs. This carton was being sold in 35 stores with a volume of 
about 800 cases per week without any advertising support. 
The selling arrangement with many retail firms involved the use of for-
mula prices pegged to the Urner Barry price. The surplus egg condition in 
early 1971 stimulated some movement away from formula pricing since retailers 
found they could frequently benefit by negotiating with several suppliers, 
some of whom were w~lling to make price concessions.6 John estimated that 
about one-half of the sales to institutional customers were on a formula 
basis. 
6Formula pricing arrangements stipulated the method for determining the 
exchange price between Landmark and customer (so many cents above or below 
the Urner Barry price, FOB retail warehouse or store). The quantity exchanged 
was normally not stipulated, however, allowing customers to buy all or none 
of their weekly needs from Landmark. Where formulas were used, they were 
renegotiated at the discretion of either party. 
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Since the individual plants and sales and distribution centers were 
separate profit centers, a transfer price was necessary when eggs from the 
processing Plants were sold through one of the three sales and distribution 
centers, or when shipped to the frozen food plant. Transfer prices were 
based upon Urner Barry prices plus or minus adjustments depending upon 
whether the eggs were bulk or cartoned, and upon who performed the transpor-
tation. The foods division staff recognized, however, that the method of 
calculating transfer prices could not only significantly affect the profi-
tability of the various profit centers, but could also influence the degree 
of cooperation and the level of intra-company cohesiveness. 
Questions concerning the procedures for establishing transfer prices 
and allocating overhead expenses cast doubts on the validity of the opera-
ting statements for the different profit centers. Were the losses shown 
for the distribution centers (Exhibit 1) accurate reflections of their 
operations, or were the processing plants benefitting at the expense of the 
distribution centers? (Exhibit 3). By mid-1971, John had had the accounting 
procedures adjusted so that consolidated statements could be developed with-
out double counting or causing serious distortion. (Exhibits 4 and 5). 
These provided a more accurate picture of the overall operations, but still 
did not provide John with much of the detailed data that would be helpful 
in dealing with the problems and decisions he faced. He knew, however, 
that several of the decisions would not wait. 
Exhibit 1: Source of Eggs and Volume Handled by Three Distribution Centers and Fr:ozen Food Plant, 196g-69 and 1969-70. 
Thousands of Cases Total All 
Columbus Cleveland Marietta Frozen Food Four Divisions 
Source of Eggs: 1969-70 1968-69 1969-70 1968-69 19 70 1969 1969-70 1968-69 1969-70 1968-69 
Northwest Plant 6.2 5.7 104.1 54.1 * 25.4 13.3 135. 7a 73 .1a 
Northeast Plant 29.0 71.7 * 18.4 11 . ;a: 47.4a 83.sa 
Wooster Plant .5 .2 120.0 129.0 * 7.5 2 .'6 128. oa 131. aa 
North Central Plant 34.3 3 7.1 57.7 61.6 * 10.0 
..1..:1. 102. oa l00.6a 
Total Landmark Plc-nts 41.0 43.0 310.8 316.4 51.1 61.3 29.6 464.2 389. oa 
Poultry Producers 57.0 57.6 51.2 11.2 * 16.5 19 . () 124.7a 87.8a 
Other ...l~ 12.6 .1 .2 32.3 6.4 _§_J!_ 40.5 18.7a 
Total Cases Received 99.7 113.2 362.1 327.9 83 . 4 84.2 54.5 629.4 495.5a 
Cases Sold: (Pounds Sold)+ 
Direct** 50.0 57.0 304.3 2 77.1 * 
Through VVarehouse 49.3 55.7 57.8 50.8 * 
Total Cases Sold 99.3 112.7 362 .1 327.9 83.9 2,780.7 1,964.2 
Cases (Short) Over (. 4) (. 5) 0 0 . 5 (Per Pound) 
Selling Price Per Dozen .486 .430 .518 .4694 .399 .283 . 2 64 
Gross Margin Per Dozen .012 .010 .010 .0092 .030 .064 .068 
Expenses Per Dozen . 027 . 02 4 .009 .0096 .034 .089 .096 
Net Savings Per Dozen (.015) (. 0 14) .001 (. 0004) {. 004) (. 02 5) (. 02 9) 
------------
a -- Doesn't include eggs so!.d through Marietta 
* --Detailed break-down of source of eggs s0ld through the Marietta distribution center is not available. Note that data for Marietta are for calendar 
year since this distri.bution facility was originally affiliated with the Wooster plant and had a different fiscaL year than the other three 
operations which originally were part of Federated Egg. Combining the figures thus involves some distortion. 
+--Pounds yield per case of eggs was 33.62 in 1969-70. Thus, a selling price of 28.3 cents per pound was equivaLent to 11.7 cents per dozen. 
** -- Direct sales refer to those where the egg~; are delivered to the customer by the processing plant and hence are never handled by the 
distribution center. 
Exhibit 2: ~mple of One Week Operating Results for Retall Dolry De-partment 
-
Dollar I Percent 
P10DUCT Sales Dept. I S<llcs 
---
~: '· J_ !( $ 493.39 21.91. J 
' 
. , , '· :Je:v.:.;rf!ges 62.87 2.8 :.. .. ~..:.:....:;4\. 
C:rer.rn .and ~r. Subs. 61.57 2.7 
-
'' 
·1 tt0r 232.96 10.4 
---.. ·-
:-.-~:· t'!oarine 226.80 10.1 I ' 
I 22.2 ., 498.89 . ' :s 
_, _ _;_~!;;c Cn2ese 98.99 4.4 
2rocessed Cheese Loufs 57.89 2.6 
-
::Heed Processed Cheese 100.88 4.5 
__ 1!1;_'2!:..~~\.t:·.,ed Cheese 0 0 I 
·-~ ..... red ~ral Cheese 129.05 I 5.7 I 
___ £!.:~ nne Si'eci.::ltv Ch I 36.26 1.6 
C.r·o2.:1m Cl:eesc 30.95 1.4 
·--. 
.. _t::;!ccse Snre.~ds anc Foods 12.62 .6 I 
~.:<)ll"' Cr.t~r.m :=tnd 
--
Dips I 55.47 2.5 
Biscuits and Dinner Rolls l~5 .68 2.0 
- I I 21.61 .9 . C::>Oki€: s .::nd Pastry 
I< ince llaneous 84.75 3.7 
$2.250.63 100.0% TOTALS 
I 
r l ! 
" 
Dollar Percent 
Gross Gross 
Profit Profit 
$ 52.51 10.6'%. 
15.63 24.9 
13.30 21.6 
25.06 10.8 
41.65 18.4 
81.47 16.3 
22.82 23.1 
14.18 24 5 
21.33 21.1 
0 I 0 
23.57 18.3 
7.12 19.6 
6.70 21.7 
1.77 14.0 
14.34 25.8 
5.14 11.3 
4.58 21.2 I 
21.57 25.5 ! 
i $372.74 16.6% i 
DA!RY DEPARlMENT SUM¥.ARY 
Store #999 
Percent Percent Ave. 
Dept. Shelf Dollar 
Gross Feet Inventory 
I!.n. 4A1. $ 71.42 
4.2 1.7 6.73 
3.6 4.8 37.85 
6.7 5 0 1i 9. 28 
11.2 8.6 509.59 
21,._9 3 7 297.41 
6.1 3 0 :w ')8 
3 8 7 2 2!2f;.. 35 
5.7 5.2 270.45 
0 0 0 
6.3 12.8 2J.2.11 
1.9 9.6 119.98 
1.8 4.5 60.54 
.5 4 5 67 2~ 
I 3.8 3 7 34 53 
-
1.4 3 2 41 50 
1.2 8 1 ].]190 
5_.8 lOLO l!fO .80 
100.01. 100.0% $2,428.26 
i R~turn Sales I GP I Inventory I on Shelf Sheli 
Turnover i Inv. Foot Foot 
-
6.2 7 3. 5'1 $69.66 $ 7.4 
7.0 I 232.2 22.86 5.E 
I 
1.3 35.2 7.99 i 1.7 
. 
1 2 13 9 29 27 i 3 l 
.4 8.2 16.44 : 3.C 
I 
1.4 27.4 83.15 I 13.5 l 
' 3 .7 llG .9 21 03 I () ·~ 
I .2 I ".4 4. 96 ~ .• 2 
.3 I 7 9 11 Q3 I I ! 2 c: 
" 
0 I 0 0 i 
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Exhibit 3: l1nnu.al Operating Results, Four Egg Packing Plants, 1970 
Total Dollars 
Dollars Per Case 
INCO~y'[E 
Total Sales 14,243,259 12.54 
Cost of Sales 11,541,837 10.16 
Gross Margin 2,701,422 2.38 
Cases 218,009 .19 
Cartons 653,553 .58 
Total Container Cost 871,563 .77 
Net Margin 1,829,858 1. 61 
Other Income 2 61 603 . 02 
Tot a 1 Income 1,856,462 1. 63 
EXPENSE 
Plant 861,886 .76 
Administrative 203,744 .18 
Trucking 575,303 .51 
Sales 62, 7 45 .06 
Total Expenses 1,703,679 l. 50 
Net Operating Savings 152,782 .14 
General Expense 122,629 .11 
Net Savings 30,153 .03 
Dividend Requirements 26,468 
Exhibit 4: Co~solidated Monthly Income Statement, Food Division, 
Landmark, Inc., August, 1971 
$ 
SALES 
Eggs $ 939,149 
Poultry 309,540 
Dairy Products 14 193 
$ 1,262,882 
GROSS MARGINS 
Eggs $ 268,225 
Poultry 2 31424 
Dairy Products 1 167 
Total Gross Margin $ 292,816 
OTHER REVENUE 
Contract Services $ 20,888 
Total Gross Revenue $ 313,704 
EXPENSES 
Packaging Materials $ 91,078 
Plant Operations 194,829 
Sales Costs 15,660 
Total Expenses $ 301,567 
SAVINGS $ 12,137 
% 
74.4 
24.5 
1.1 
100.0 
21.2 
1.9 
0.1 
23.2 
1.7 
24.8 
7.2 
15.4 
1.2 
23.8 
1.0 
Note: Exhibits 4 and 5 include the processing plants, distribution 
centers and frozen egg operation combined. 
Exhibit 5: Consolidated Balance Sheet, Food Division, LandTP<'~rk, Inc., 
December, 1970 
ASSETS (000) 
Current Assets: 
Cash 
Accounts Receivable (Net) 
Inventories 
Pre pa1d Expenses 
Total Current Assets 
Non-Current As sets: 
Fixed Assets (Net) 
Investments 
Total Non-Current Assets 
Total Assets 
LIABILITIES 
Current Liabilities 
Non-Current Liabilities 
Net Worth 
Total Liabilities 
$ 270.8 
1,251.4 
319.7 
2 5. 2 
$ 1,867.1 
$ 740.0 
649.3 
$ 1,389.3 
$ 3,256.4 
$ 1,239.2 
655.7 
1,361.4 
$ 3,256.4 
NOTE: The processing plants represented 80 percent of total assets, 
one-half of which were non-current. 
Exhibit 6: Dasic Types of Table Cgg Product1un Contracts 
and the Obli:~ation;; of Euch Party Concerned 
Producer Contractor 
Jr.<~rket Contract 1. Provides Lirds, feed, 1. Agrees to tak0 all 
supplies, buildings, eggs produced 
equipnent, and labor 
2. Follow egg quality 2. Pays for eggs basvJ 
progran prescribed by on quality cmJ 
contructor volumP received 
1'roducer Contracts 
A. Credit type J. Provides labor, equipm~nt, 1. Provillcs birds, feed, 
Jnd buildings medic.-:1t ion, and utlwr 
?. 1·1ar1<.ets all eggs and fm1l suppl Lt'S. 
to most favorabl~ outleL 2. Charges 6 percent 
3. Pays for'usc o( birds, inter(':>t on account!> 
interest charges on credit due 
extended, bears all . ' r lSt<.S -- 3. Does not shan· prntit. 
profit or lo:;;, or loss 
B. Control quantity 1. Provides labor, equipment, 
nnd quality of and bui1r1ings mcdicativn, and other 
Cgf} supply 2. ~cceives flat Fer· and/or suppltt~s 
incentive paymc:ntB fur 2. Controls management 
resource supplies of floc!: and ~!gt; 
J. Follous flock uc~nngcmC'nt proces~~ing, including 
practices recommended by distribution 
1;ontractor 
Source: A. William Jasper, "Contracts for Table Egg Production in the United States,' 
oaoer oresented to 13th World's Poultrv Conqress, August, 1966. 
Appendix A. Landmark, Inc. (B) 
CHANGES UN THE EGG INDUSTRY AND 
PR ECTIONS FOR 1980 
By William E. Cathcart 
Agricultural Economist 
Economic Research Service 
ABSTRACT: The egg i..nci.JJ.e;.tluJ ha.& ex.pa.nded ~towty du.Ju:.ng the. ta.td: 2 de~ 
attd -iA upedtd to gJWW .M .. owty du/Un.g the 1970 '~. I""Mved ~~Wta.geme.n.t, 
bJteedbtg, and 6e.e.d..i.Mg en 6.ici.e.nc.tJ have conrubute.d to an btC.Jte.a..s e. bt .the 
nu.mbVt o6 e.gg.o pMduc.e.d pelt hen and :to lu.& 6e.e.d Jtequ.ilte.d pu de zen. e.gg6. 
s.ttw.c.tulu:U. cha.ngu, J,u.ch cu. l.tiJI.gell. pMdu.c.Utg ~ a.nd gJtOWth .in con-
Vu!.c.ti.ng plAyed a.n -impoJt..tan.t M~ i..n the. deve.top!'l'le.YI-t o6 p~en.t pJU:Jdu.ct.ion 
and ma:.l!.ke.dng pJUtc.t.ic.u. Pelt ~ con.oump.tiim. o6 e.g~ ha.e, decU.ne.d. 
T ota.t c.on.1ump..Uon o 6 e.gg.t; 4..6 u.per..ted .to ex.pand dwv..ng the 19 7 0 'a bu.t at 
a ~icwe/1. JU:lte than popu.l.a.ticm .inCM.a.bU. 
KEY WORV.S: Egg pJt.Odu.c..tiOYI., e.gg c.o11.6ump.t.ton, egg pJUc.e..&, e.g~ pJt.o je.cti.oM. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many changes have occurred in the 
egg industry since the advent of spe-
cialized flocks for egg production. The 
develo~ent of the broiler industry from 
the spring fryer markets resulted in more 
emphasis being placed on the development 
of' laying flocks for the sole purpose of 
producing eggs more efficiently. 
Egg output expanded slowly prior 
to World War II--from 33 billion eggs in 
1922 to 40 billion in 1940. Production 
expanded rapidly during the early 1940's 
and totaled 59 billion in 1944. Follov-
ing the curtailment of wartime needs, 
output decl~ned and did not recover to 
earlier levels until 1950. Since then, 
production and consumption have trended 
slowly upwrard (table 1). 
But the increase in consumption 
has not kept pace with the growth in 
population, so consumption of eggs per 
person has declined. 1/ 
TRENDS AND DEVElOPMENTS IN PRODUCTION 
Production: Egg production during 
the 1950's expanded at an average annual 
rate of about l percent despite a 4-year 
decline at the beginning of the period. 
Since 1960, egg production increased at 
l-1/2 percent a year. The increase in 
production prior to 1960 resulted from 
about a 2 percent annual increase in the 
rate of lay as the number of layers de-
clined by over 1 percent a year. After 
1960 the larger production was caused by 
a small increase in both layer numbers 
and rate of lay (figure 1). 
The number of layers fell from 340 
milUon in 1950 to 295 million in 1960, 
then trended upward to 317 million in 
1967. Layer numbers declined in 1968 and 
iJ For a more comprehensive treatment 
of changes in the egg industry, see 
Rogers, George B.; Con1ogue, Robert M.; 
and Irvin, Ruth J., Economic Character-
istics £f.~ Chges .!!!, 2, Market !':II 
Industrz, ERS, USDA, Mlffi No. eff7, April 
1970. 
Source: Poultry and Egg Situation 262, Econ. Research Serv., U.S.D.A.~ 
June, 1970. ' 
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Figure l 
1969, but with the exception of 1967, 
were higher than any year since the early 
1950's. 
The number of eggs produced per hen 
has trended upward but at a declining 
rate. In the 19)0-59 period, the rate of 
lay expanded at an average annual rate of 
2 percent--from 17!~ to 207 eggs. Since 
1959 the rate of increase has averaged 
about half of l percent. The rate of lay 
averaged 220 eggs in 1969. 
Increased Production Efficiency: 
Improved management, breeding and feeding 
efficiency have made it possible to pro-
duce the same q_uanti ty of eggs in 1970 
from fewer layers and a smaller q_uantity 
of feed and other inputs. For example, 
in 1950 about 340 million layers produced 
59 billion eggs or an average of 174 eggs 
per layer. For 1969, less than 315 mil-
lion layers produced 69 billion eggs, an 
average of 220 eggs per layer. This was 
17 percent more eggs produced by 1 percent 
fewer layers. In addition, less feed was 
req_uired per unit of production. 
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l./ Averr.J.ge ru11::ouer on lw.no d.uring the 
year. !:_/ Nwnber of eggs proauced during 
the yeur uiviueu by the uverae;e number of 
..:.<J.;, ers on uu.nu <.111ring tLe year. 
Feed cost is a major fac~r in egg 
production, accounting for around half of 
total cost. USDA computes the average 
feed uniLs used to produce 100 e~. gj 
Feed requ1red to proauce 1 dozen eggs in 
JUNE 1970 
1969 was about a pound lower than in the 
early 1950's. Industry and research re-
ports indicate that in recent years around 
5 pounds of feed were required to produce 
a yozen eggs. 
CHANGING STRUCTURE AND LOCATION 
The number and size of egg produc-
ing units have changed dramatically dur-
ing the past 2 decades • More eggs are 
being produced by f~~er producers in a 
system that is moving towards more 
coordinated production. Production has 
shifted geographically and many changes 
have occurred in the marketing system 
for eggs. 
~ But Larger Producers: 'J) The 
number of farms selling eggs fell sharply 
from 2.4 million in 1949 to 527,000 in 
1964. In 1949 most eggs were produced 
on a relatively small scale, often part-
tlme poultry enterprises and on general 
fd.rms. Farms with less than 400 chickens 
4 months old and older accounted for two-
~hlrds of all eggs sold in 1949. But 
most of the small laying flocks have dis-
appeared from the scene and egg produc-
tion has become concentrated on larger 
more specialized farms. 
Comparable data were not reported 
in the 1964 Census. But in 1SI64, farms 
with less than 400 chickens 4 months old 
and over accounted for less than a fifth 
of all chickens of this age on farms. 
This compares with 76 percent in 1950. 
Also in 1964, about 16, 000 farms sellir..g 
50,000 dozen or more eggs accounted for 
more than two-thirds of all eggs sold. 
The largest 1, 000 farms selling eggs in 
ly64 produced over a fifth of all eggs 
and the same 1,000 farms sold twice as 
many eggs as 422,000 farms selling less 
than 5,000 dozen each. Although 1969 
census data are not yet available, t.hey 
likely will show that producers have con-
tinued to decline in number but increase 
in size. 
In recent years, forced molting or 
recycling of hens has been used more 
widely as a production technique in large 
specialized operations. Hens that have 
about finished laying for the season are 
taken off feed for a period of time to 
ind,ce molting. After the molt is com-
pleted the hens are kept for another pro-
duction period. Although they normally 
do not produce as many eggs or as good 
quality, some indw~try reports indicate 
that under same price situations the real-
ized net return for the laying period can 
be higher than replacing the flock with 
pullets. 
The decline in the number of laying 
flocks and the trend to larger operations 
reflect many factors affecting the supply 
and demand for eggs. 
GJ;Ovth of Contract Production: Con-
tract production has played an important 
role in the changing structure of the egg 
industry. However, contract production 
has not been used in the egg indus try to 
the extent of that for the broiler and 
turkey industries. 
Only a small proportion o~ total egg 
production vas under contract in the late 
1950's--probably less than 5 percent. !/ 
By 1968, e~ produced under some type o~ 
contractual arrangement between the grower 
and other firms associated with the 
gj Hodges, Earl F., Consumption £!:_ 
~ ~ Livestock 1940-59, ERS, USDA, 
PRR No. 79, March 1964. 
:J Data ~rom Bureau of Census, 1964 
U.S. Census of Agriculture, Livestock, 
PoultrJ::, ~ Livestock and Poultr;y ~ 
ucts, Vol. II, Chapter 2. 
f!) Baker, Ralph L. 1 Integrating !':& 
Production ~ Marketing. AMS, USDA, 
MRR No. 332, June 1959· 
CHANGES IN EGG PRODUCTION, 
IY lEGIONS, 1959 TO 1969 
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industry were estimated to account for 30 
t~ 35 percent of total egg production. 2/ 
Egg handlers, feed companies, and 
producers developed contract production 
and owner integrated programs to help 
solve quality, supply and cost problema 
and expand outlets for feed. Growers 
entered into contract programs so they 
could expand operations, reduce risks, 
acquire financial and technical assist-
ance, and establish market outlets. 
Contract production involves a con-
tract to produce eggs under certain con-
ditions. A typical contract widely used 
is where the pullets, feed and most other 
inpttts are furnished by the contractor, 
and the producer furnishes housing facil-
ities and the necessary labor. The eggs 
belong to the contractor and the producer 
is usually paid a fixed amount on the 
basis of egsa produced and often with 
provisions for an additional incentive 
p&yment based on efficiency of production 
and quality of eggs produced. 
Geographic Shifts 1a Production: 
Egg production over the years has tended 
to shift to the South and West. Produc-
tion increased 75 percent in the South 
from 1959 to 1969 and increased 39 percent 
in the West, while output in the North 
fell over a fourth. Most of the decline 
was in the North Central region (figure 2). 
In 1959, the West North Central region 
accounted for more than 25 percent of to-
tal production but fell to less than 14 
percent in 1969. The South Atlantic region, 
the smallest producer in 1959, increased 
from 12 percent of the total in 1959 to 
over a fifth in 1969. The South Central 
region's share also increased from 14 per-
cent to over a fifth. Thus, the South 
increased its share of production from 24 
percent in 1950 to 42 percent for 1969 
(table 2). 
j} Gallimore, William W. and Vertrees, 
James G., fi Comparison 21, Returns je 
Poultry Growers. ERS, USDA, MRR No. 814 1 
February 1968. 
J1x of the lU largest ~gg producing 
~t~tes in 1969 were in the South. During 
the early 1950's much of the product1on 
was cc.1centrated in Iowa, Minnesota, 
Jl~inois, Onic, Indiana, and Wisconsin. 
~nese 3tates all ranked in the top 10 
in 1~50 and produced nearly a fourth of 
the eggs. By 1969 all of these, except 
Iowa and Indiana, had been replaced by 
.3outhern States. 
Marketing Ch.anges: Changes have 
come about in egg marketing over the 
years, largely in conjunction with the 
trend to larger size and declining num-
ber of production units. ~st eggs are 
marketed as shell eggs--about 83 percent 
in 1969. About 10 percent of production 
goes for processed egg products, 6-8 per-
cent for hatching purposes and less than 
half a percent for expbrt. 
As shell eggs move from producer to 
consumer, channels of oovement may vary. 
Eggs may move direct from producer to 
consumer or they m&.y pass through buying 
stations to assemblers, to wholesale 
distributors, to retail outlets and then 
to the consumers. Prior to the 196o's, 
around two-thirds of the eggs ooved 
through wholesale distributors to re-
tailers and institutional buyers. §/ 
Approximately half of the eggs handled 
by these firms came from producers and 
the remainder from assembler-packers. 
vince 1960, assembler-packers have be-
come predomint:l.D.t. Their share has risen 
substantially as the proportion of eggs 
passing through wholesalers has declined 
by at least 50 percent. In recent years, 
large producers have tended to ship their 
eggs direct to wholesale markets or to 
sell them direct to large retail outlets. 
The location of facilities for 
grading and cartoning of eggs also has 
changed. These operations were first 
performed largely by wholesalers in 
central markets. To provide closer con-
trol over the ~uality of eggs being 
offered to customers, chain stores began 
t.o grade and carton eggs and bypass the 
wholesaler. Improved procedures in 
recent years have switched much of the 
grading and cartoning back towards the 
producing end, primarily to ~sembler-
,J1JNl'. 1')70 
packers. Costs of these operat~ons 
gener~lly are lower in producing areas 
than in the egg room of the retailer. 
Also, producers are cartoning an in-
creasing proportion of eggs. 
Processed eggs take a small but 
growing share of the market. The use of 
eggs for processed egg products has 
trended upward both in quantity and as a 
proportion of production. In the early 
1950's, 10 to 12 million cases or about 
6 percent of total egg production went 
into processed egg products. Although 
below year-earlier levels, eggs used in 
processed egg products in 1969 totaled 
16 million cases, about 9 percent of 
production. Processed egg products to 
primarily to commercial food manufacturers 
or institutional food firms, with rela-
tively small amounts going to consumer 
markets or industrial outlets. 1/ 
Consum,ption Growth~: Total use 
of eggs. has trended slowly upward, from 
4.9 billion dozen in 1950 to 5·3 billion 
in 1969. Consumption increased during 
the 1950's, declined in the early 1960's, 
and has moved slowly upward since 1963. 
Over the two decades, consumption in-
creased less than the increase in popula-
tion, resulting in a decline in per capita 
use of eggs (table 1). 
Population of the 48 States increased 
from 152 million 1n 1950 to over 200 mil-
lion in 1969. Per capita consumption of 
eggs averaged 390 eggs a year in the early 
1950's but declined to 317 eggs in 1963. 
Since 1963, per capita consumption has 
fluctuated with no clear trend evident. 
While national per capita disposable 
income gained from less than $1,400 in 
1~50 to over $3,000 for 1969, egg prices 
generally declined. This resulted in a 
§7 Rogers, George B. and Voss, Leonard 
B. 1 Pricing Systems !.£!: ~ ERS, USDA, 
MRR No. 850, May 1969. 
1../ James, Harold B., Jr., Processed 
Egg Products: !:., Ma.rketi!l£i OPJX?rtuni ty, 
ERS, USDA, Marketing and Transportation 
~>i tuation, February 1969. 
Joll..J.r p'4rchc..slng oore eggs in 1~67 and 
u6d than in most other years since 1950, 
~o~nile the B!:illit: iollar would purch<tse less 
'.-:: most otner food i terns. For exGUllple, 
in recent years, retail prices of eggs 
n~ve been considerably lower relative to 
meats. In 1947-49 a pound of Choice beef 
at retail was equivalent in price to a 
duzen (large Grade A) eggs and a pound of 
1~rk was equivalent to 0.8 dozen of eggs. 
BJ· 1967-69 the price of a pound of beef 
at retail was equivalent to 1.6 dozen 
=ggs, !:Uld a pound of pork was equivalent 
t.o ~ . j dozen eggs. 
Prices Decline: Egg prices have 
generally trended downward since the late 
l~40's. Prices paid to producers for 
ep-,gs dVeraged 46 cents a dozen in 1947-
., J. ::lince 1950, prices generally trended 
downward to a low of 31 cents a dozen 
i '}r l')67. Prices showed some recovery in 
l;6d and were particularly strong in 
196~, rising to their highest levels 
since the early 1950's. A small reduc-
~ion in egg output, strong consumer de-
mand, relatively high meat prices and 
~ncreased quantities of eggs going for 
both hatchery use and breaking purposes 
~ontributed to the 1969 strength. 
Even though prices of eggs trended 
downward over the years, per capita egg 
use i.J.lso declined. Demand for eggs 
dppears to have been tempered by a number 
of factors. Less strenuous work for much 
of the population has reduced the need 
for a large breakfast. And with more 
married women in the l~.J.bor force, eggs 
for breakfast have been replaced by 
cereals and sweet rolls or no brecikfast. 
Also, people in general are more con-
cerned about weight and health problems. 
Adverse publicity in recent years about 
cholesterol and its possible effect on 
health likely has reduced the demand for 
eggs. 
Methods of determining basic price 
levels for eggs have not kept pace with 
the rapid changes in production and 
marketing over the years. In 1966, :on-
gress appropriated special funds to USDA 
for a study of how market eggs are priced 
and what changes should be made to improve 
or change the present pricing systems for 
eggs more nearly to reflect changes in the 
demand for and supply of eggs. 
A large amount of research work on 
pricing and related subjects has been 
completed and published. In mid-1969 a 
committee was formed, largely from the 
industry, to study and make recommenda-
tions for change in egg pricing methods. 
On May 20, 1970, this committee issued 
its recommendations and nelda public 
meeting June 4 to discuss them. 
PROJECTIONS 
Prospects for the egg industry dur-
ing the 1970's, like those for other 
agricultural enterprises, depend on many 
factors--not only those peculiar to the 
egg industry, but also those affecting 
consumer incomes and preferences and the 
supplies and relative costs of closely 
competing products. 'rhe projections for 
eggs are based on the following a ssump-
tions, some of which may not materialize: 
(l) Population increase not expected to 
quite match the 14 percent growth of the 
sixties; (2) continued general economic 
growth, with~ period of easing inflation-
ary pressures followed by a slower rise 
in the general price level; (3) high em-
ployment levels and rising labor costs; 
and (4) continued low prices for eggs 
relative to prices of red meats. 
Production ~ ~ 12_ Expc~.nd Slow-
~: Egg production and use will continue 
to expand slowly during the 1970's--prob-
ably at around 1 percent a year. Thus, 
output in 198o is projected around a tenth 
above the 5· 7 million dozen in 1969. Such 
growth in the market for eggs may require 
only a small increase in the number of 
layers. How many more will largely depend 
on the rate of lay. Output per hen will 
likely continue to increase slowly--to 
around 230 eggs per year by 198o, com-
pared with 220 in 1969. If this occurs, 
the projected growth in the market for 
~980 would require an expansion of about 
5 percent in the number of layers--from 
the 313 million in 1969· However, if 
the practice of recycling old hens gains 
substantially, the rate of lay might not 
gain and could trend downward. 
Imports of eggs and egg products 
likely will add little to the egg supply. 
Imports of eggs during the 1960's aver-
aged less than 0.1 percent of U.S. pro-
duction. Although imports may show some 
increase, they are expected to continue 
+N be of minor importance in the 1970's. 
Exports of eggs at the end of the 
decade likely will be near recent levels 
of '+0-50 m.illion dozens. Eggs used for 
natching--both for broiler and egg-type 
chicks will increase, possibly to 550 
to ;60 million dozens by 1980. Most, if 
n0t all, the increase in hatching eggs 
use will go for larger broiler production. 
Egg production going for export and hatch-
ing pUPpOses would account for about 10 
percent of projected production, compared 
with 7 percent in 1969. 
m Ca;pita ~ .!:2_ Sli;p: 'lbtal use 
of eggs is expected to increase around a 
tenth OYer the decade, slightly leas than 
the projected growth in popuJ.ation; and 
z:oore eggs will be used for hatching. Thus, 
per capita consumption of egga likely 
will continue to trend slowly downward--
declining by perhaps around 5 percm. t from 
the 316 eggs consumed in 1969. The de-
cline will be in table eggs aa consump-
tion of processed e~ is expected to 
gain. Quantity of shell egga going into 
such production by 198o may average sub-
stantially above the equivalent of 31 eggs 
used per person in 1969. 
Table 1..--Eggs: Supply and utilization, 195o..f9 l· ~ 
-~ 
Supply : Utilization 
Beginning stocks Y : ~ ................. _ .......... ",... Exports and shipments: 
Year . Produc-:Imports: : :Eg~a ttllledt for : Mili-
Ending 
ti on : 'J/ ; COIIII!IIer-: USDA gj . cial. ~tal 
Total 
supply stocks .cammer-: USDA 
• cial • '2./ '1'\:>tal : hatching: ta.ry §j :1f Total 
Per 
capita 
Mil. 
: doz. 
~: 
Mil. 
doz. 
Mil. 
~ 
Mil. 
~ 
Mil. 
doz. 
Mil. 
~ 
Mil. 
~ 
Mil. 
doz. 
Mil. 
~ 
Mil. 
doz. 
Mil. 
doz. 
Mil. 
doz. 
Mil. 
doz. No. 
1950 : 5 ,4o4 20 53 206 259 5,683 356 30 150 18o 200 71 !Y4 ,875 389 
1951 : 5 '322 8 52 304 356 5 '686 lo8 39 215 25~ 226 155 4 '941 393 
1952 I 5,323 8 63 45 1o8 5,439 54 54 ll 65 218 118 4,984 390 
1953 : 5,307 7 54 - 54 5,368 3B 58 --- 58 227 ll7 4,928 379 
1954 : 5, 4o2 4 36 --- 38 5 , 444 69 64 -- 64 224 101 4 • 986 376 
1955 : 5,407 2 69 --- 69 5,478 73 63 2 65 228 91 5,021. 371 
1956 : 5,500 2 73 -- 73 5,575 88 59 5 ~ 256 80 5,o87 369 
1957 : 5,4l.2 1 88 -- 88 5,531 68 50 --- 50 252 83 5 078 362 
1958 : 5. 4l.2 2 68 -- 68 5 '512 49 39 5 44 287 70 5, o62 3'>4 
1959 : 5,542 1 45 -- 45 5,588 65 50 4 54 28o 63 5:125 352 
1960 : 5,339 3 65 --- 65 5,4<>7 51 42 2 44 282 63 4,967 334 
1<)61 : 5,358 3 51 --- 51 5,412 48 4o 2 42 302 64 4 956 328 
1962 : 5,4<>3 2 48 -- 48 5,453 50 32 -- 32 303 70 4' 998 326 
1963 : 5,345 1 50 --- 50 5,396 44 42 1 43 304 67 41 938 317 
1964 : 5,435 2 44 --- 44 5,481 46 30 2 32 312 76 s'o15 318 
1965 : 5,474 1 46 -- 46 5,521 41 39 --- 39 333 94 5:014 314 
1966 : 5,54<> 15 41 -- -1 5,596 28 41 --- 41 365 102 5,o6o )13 
1967 : 5,e36 4 28 -- 26 5,868 11 55 -- 55 361 uo s m .323 
1968 I 5,173 6 71 --- 71 5,IJ50 56 46 --- 46 364 lo8 5:276 320 
1269 9/ : 5.744 9 56 - " 5.809 34 41 --- 41 ~94 83 5.257 316 
1/ Beginning in 1960, includes Alaska artd Hawaii. 
g/·Estimated farm output plus nonfarm production estimated at 10 percent of fann production in 1950-54. Beginning in 19)5, 
this adjustment was reduced 1 percentage point per year to zero in 1964. 
3/ Shell ~ggs and the approximate shell-egg equivalent of dried and frozen eggs. fJJ Storage stocks include shell eggs and the approximate shell-egg equivalent of frozen eggs. In 1950-~·b commercial stor-
age holdings alSO included the shell-egg equivalent of reported stocks of dried eggs solids. 
5/ Beginning in 1955 exports under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and USDA donations to 'furri tories. £I E&tt.ated on the basis of chickens hatched, 
7/ Includes USDA donations to military and military feeding of civilians in occupied territoriPs. ~ ~ Excludes storage losses of 1 million do:r.en in 1950, 
2J PreliliLinary. f-' .[) 
-..J () 
1'1) 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
; 
Year : 
Table 2 .-t.ggs. Number produced by regions and for ~he U.~., ~<>lect"?-d years, l~o-6w 
~-- -----~~~-
North : t.ast ; West : South : Liouth : !Jn~ten 
: North : North : : Central : west ]} : Atlant~c Atlantic States Central : Central 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mill1ons - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6,298 8,593 10,415 3,443 6,618 4,340 39~~7v/ 
8,335 11,389 16,913 4,669 9,583 5,332 56,221 
1.),137 11,7-<3 16,690 5,156 8,786 6,442 58,954 
1u,C)93 11,o91 16,584 5,546 7,347 7,365 59,526 
lO,o40 lC,7<)8 15,113 8,o84 8,78q 8,778 b1,602 
' 1965 : 9.986 9,673 11,860 11,333 12,382 10,458 65,692 
1966 : 9,765 9,485 11,158 12,186 13,144 10,746 66,484 
1967 : 9,839 9,832 11,251 13,285 14,482 11,342 70,031 
1968 : 9,639 9.759 10,075 13,541 14,672 11,584 69,270 
1969 : 9,772 9,311 9.457 14,402_ -~~--_!b39tl 1,1,585 68,925 
1/ For 1960, Hawaii is included in the West, since 1960 both Hawaii and Alaska. 
Table 3 .--Poultry and eggs: Civilian per capita consumption, 1g6o-69 
Eggs Chickens 
Year Turkeys 
Shell Processed Total Broilers .!<'ann Total 
Total 
poultry 
- - - - - - -~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
lg60 
1961 
1962 
1g63 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1<)68 
1969 
3o6 
298 
296 
290 
287 
285 
283 
289 
288 
285 
28 
30 
30 
27 
31 
29 
30 
34 
32 
31 
334 23.3 4.7 
328 25.8 4.2 
326 25.6 4.3 
317 26.9 3.8 
318 27.5 3.5 
314 29.4 3.9 
313 32.2 3.8 
323 32.7 4.4 
320 33-0 4.4 
316 35.1 4.1 
28.0 6.1 34.1 
30.0 7.4 37.4 
20.9 7.0 36.') 
30.7 6.8 37.) 
31.0 7-3 38.3 
13.} 7.4 40.7 
36.0 7.8 43.8 
37.1 5.6 45.7 
37.4 7-9 45.1 
1Q.,> 8.4 47.6 
&; 
I 
\: 
>?" 
~ 
...., 
\() 
.._J 
0 
APPENDIX B I LANDMARK, INC. I (B) 1 
t))()l{DlN.r\l Tm; UF PRUllt.:C fLO',, LNI.'UT-SUPPLY I~;G, AND t-1ARKETl~iG 
~_,f_ructural £volut ion of the_ J:..gg Indus trv 
In the earlv days of the poultry industry, the poultryman performed many 
fu·1ctions. He frequently kept a breeding flock, hatched his own chicks, grew 
nut his own replacements, and sold live or dressed surplus cockerels, cull 
pullets, and fowl at the farn:. H.: hauled eggs and poultry to local buying 
l>tdtions, stores, and consumers, made his nwn equipment, handmixed his own 
t l'l'd, and did considerahle experimenting with feeds, strains of birds, remedit~s 
f 1.1r diseases and parasites, a-nd management. In a sense, his operations wert: 
vertically integrated. But he performed many of these function~ as much from 
necessity as from choice, since the industry was composed mainly of small, 
decentralized units. 
This type of indus try gradually gave way to one characterized by increased 
specialization. Better communication and transportation developed, new methods 
\,'f:>re used and neh' services offered, and new technology made larger production 
•. t'ld marketing un:ts fc>asible. Breeding and hatching functions left the 
1This section contains selected excerpts from "Economic Characteristics 
of the Changes in the Market Egg Industry, .. MRR 877, Economic Research 
Service , U . S . De part me nt of Agriculture , April , 19 7 0 . 
individual farm, as spt>cialized strains for meat or egg production were 
d,_,velo.ped. Fet::dmixing passed largely to the commercial mills. Large-scale 
commercial equipment, feed supplement, and cHsease-control (remedies and 
vaccines) companies emerged. 
Many of the producer's functions came to be performed by others. Mills 
and feed stores began to handle equipment, supplies, and remedies. Commercial 
slaughtering plants and egg-handling plants came to the farm for supplies and 
began to perform additional marketing functions for the farmer. Xany of the 
organizations selling inputs to the producer and marketing his poultry and eggs 
were farmer cooperatives. Public agencies and private firms went into 
scientific research. 
In the last two decades, the egg industry has entered a third stage of 
structural evolution. This stage has involved reintegrating various functions 
vertically and horizontally under an overall management. While economies of 
scale- and the need for greater utilization of capacity have forced a general 
trend toward fewer and larger units, other forces have promoted a similar trend 
toward large-scale coordination. Among these forces are: the possibilities 
for accelerating the adoption of production technology; the need for increased 
product standardization to supply mass-merchandising outlets; the need for a 
way of more effectively meeting the capital requirements of a mechanized and 
commercialized agriculture; and the need to obtain greater bargaining power and 
promote more orderly marketing. Conglomerate integration has also moved into 
egg production, including the input-supplying segments of the industry, as a 
means of minimizing risk and assembling financial strength. This development 
is not yet as widespread in egg production as in broiler production, but it is 
continuing. 
Following a pattern similar to developments in the broiler industry after 
World War II, contract production and financing of egg production by input-
supplying and marketing firms increased rapidly during the late 1950's and 
1960's. As with broiler production, the tendency has been for contracting to 
supplant looser financing arrangements, and for more contracts to stress flat-
fee or production-efficiency payments rather than market prices, in determining 
producer returns. 
Also during the 1950's and 1960's, there was an expansion of quality-
control programs and marketing agreements. But these remain somewhat unique 
for eggs. Under quality-control programs, the packing plant establishes a list 
of desired practices relating to the management and feeding of layers, the 
strains of birds to be kept, and the gathering and holding of eggs. These 
practices may be required or recommended for producers; flock supervisors may 
v:!.sit farms' at given intervals to check on compliance. With marketing agree-
ments, the packing plant attempts to get producers to agree to sell all or a 
given share of their eggs to the plant. The effort is essentially one to 
achieve a stable volume for the packing operation. With contract production, 
the contractor typically handles or arranges for marketing the eggs. Thus, 
an element of stability in plant volume is added for the contractor's plant or 
the plant to whom he sells. 
Sp~cialized egg-marketing rooperatives, and other types uf cooperatiVeti 
that handle eggs as a sideline, have long played an important role in packinr; 
dnd marketing eggs for producer-members. Some of these cooperatives stilJ 
11andle producers eggs in the quantities and qualities that producers choose tt 
sell through them. Other cooperatives have instituted c;uality-control prograrr . ...; 
ar,d concluded marketing agreements with their producers. The pricing basis ft·~ 
p;.,JCiucers under quality-control programs or marketing agreements is often 
Jlfferent from that for those who use the cooperative to dispose of surpluses 
1•1 particular grades and sizes. Cooperatives also sell major production input~. 
~uch as feed, as well as equipment, supplies, and building materials. Some 
~ngage in financing producers and in contract production. The newer types oi 
cooperative organLzations which have emerged in recent years generally stress 
l'lark<~t information, market stabi 1ization, and bargaining activities rather than 
•.>perating functions. 
A substantial number of large-scale, owner-integrated egg enterprises have 
been developed during the last two decades. At the highest level of integrd-
tion, these enterpri.ses combine production, hatching, feed milling, and egg 
packing. In others, production and one or more other functions are combined. 
Uften these enterprises are so large and well balanced that no connection with 
other firms exists except in procuring raw inputs and selling the final product. 
At a lesser level of coordination, quasi-integration mav be practiced by several 
large producers. Some examples of the latter include groups who buy feed in 
volume, are the sole suppliers to a packing plant, or jointly operate units 
pprforming other functions. 
In recent years, other fin::s important in egg production have "gone public" 
<.md their stocks arc' regularly 'lW•ted. Some firms are already engaged in egg 
production and other activities in mon.· than one re~ion of the country, and 
otllL'rs are joining this group through expansions, acquisitions, and mergers. 
It is also Jikeiv tltat, following similar dl·velopml'nts in the poultry industry, 
additional egg indnstry firms will be ,1bsorhed by conglomeratP organizations 
engaged in agricultural and nunagri<·ultural activities. 
Comprehensive and continuing data series to reveal ongoing changes in 
various kinds of integrated and coordinated arrangements are generally lackinp. 
Hc•·..Jever, secondary data and individnal State studies do provide some measure-
ments of these developments at particular poi.nts in tir:1e. 
Census and other data indicate that contracting is much more prevalent in 
th<: South and West than in other regions (table 40). However, the extent of 
contracting, as well as its form, varies not only among regions but among 
States within a region. 
ln the North Atlantic region, contracting is more prevalent in Northern 
New England than Ln Southern New England or the Middle Atlantic States. In 
Maiue, r>3 percent uf the commercial egg farms and !,2 percent CJf 1 ayers were 
under contract production programs in 1968, compared with 35 and 2H percent, 
r(~spectivPly, in J9(d (lJ). While only 15 percent of New Hampshire's commer-
cial l'!sg farnLs and lh pcrct:>nt <'f layl·rs on these farms were under contract in 
la'-,!c· .·,n.-··>l,·a:·;iH··~> .. f integration and coordination in the market egg industry, 
by region 
Region 
Eggs sold on 
contract in 1964 
as percentage of 
11 .S. average _Jj 
·-- ---·--·-----------.--· --
North Atlantic · · ·. 
East North Central: 
West North Central: 
South Atlantic · · ·: 
South Central · · · ·: 
Wes t:Prn • · · • · • · · · ·: 
J:nited States 
Percent 
67 
42 
19 
147 
177 
131 
HlO 
Chickens on hand 
age 4 months or 
:over as percentage 
:of all chickens in 
flocks of 5,000 
or more, 1964 2/ 
Percent 
10.3 
4.8 
2.0 
14.4 
2 3. 1 
45.0 
13.9 
;Eggs sold by co-ops 
. as percentage of 
:total eggs produc~d, 
· 1962-66 average 11 
Percent 
20 
14 
10 
16 
8 
19 
14 
--··---·---·------ ----·--------- --·-- --·-------·-- ----
]j Est I mated I f'>on. Res. Serv. from Census and other data. 
?_/ Census data. 
3/ Estimated hy Econ. Res. Serv. using data from Farmer Coop. Serv. and Cons. 
an d Mk t g . S e r v . 
Suur~e: Econ. RPs. Serv., C.S. Dept. Agr., prepared from above series. 
lllb4 (.!.§_), the proportions under contract have since increased. A New York 
survey in 1964 indicated 40 percent of layers were under contracts or agree-
ments, but only 4.6 percent were in contract egg production. In addition, 
l.l. :, percent were under financing agreements, 21.2 percent under egg-marketing 
agreements, and 2.8 pf'rcent under both of these (~, p. 5). New .Jersey had 
vlrtuallv no contract production in 1964 (36). 
Contracts and agreements are bt:·lieved to be more prevalent in such States 
as Indiana, Michigan, and Missouri than in most others in the ~orth Central 
r~·gion. YPt in total, such arrangements--particularly for contract produr·tion--
.n .. : less common in this reg.ion than in other surplus regions. ln 1961, ab.Jut 
i.) pprcent of Judi ana's 1 ayer Jl<lplllation was involved in varying types of 
ct•llt ractual arrangements (_!1_, p. 1). By 19()7, 19 processors, handling half of 
J :1d 1 ana's eggs, o,.vere procuring over half their eggs through contract production 
( 3CJ, p. 2). In 1964, 40 to 50 pt,rcent of >lissouri 's eggs were produced under 
ct~~tracts and agreements, but most of these were marketing contracts only (1£.). 
C<)ntract produdion in Iowa was about 10 percent of total production in 1967 (37). 
Sample information suggests contract production accounted for one-third 
Llt r:enrgia's egg output in 1959-64 (10, p. 34; 36) and up to 35 to 40 percent 
• 1967 (3_7). \·Jhile onlv 'i tu !0 perct>nt l'f Al-abama's tarde eggs 1..rere produced 
and •rwrkt•tt>d un,jeJ cuntract in 19">9 (:!:_!~, p. 6), 4rl percent were undt'r contract 
by l964 (J6j. By 1965-66, at least 35 percent of table .egg production in 
Louisiana was under a contract system (40, p. 5]). In Mississippi, contrac~ 
production, which accounted for only 2 percent of commercial layers in 1956. 
accounted for one-third by 1959 (12., p. 3), and the current level is probab ,y 
much higher. In Arkansas, those firms with contract growers accounted for 
75 percent of all production included in a 1964 survey (!, p. 10). 
While no overall direct measurements of the development of large owner-
integrated complexes are available, some indication of this development can bf· 
suggested. Such units are most likely to have large flocks of laying hens. 
According to the 1964 Census of Agriculture, flocks of 50,000 or more birds are 
most common in the Western region (particularly in the Pacific Coast States and 
next most common in the South and the North Atlantic region. Fewer flocks an.• 
so large in the Midwest (table 40). Figures on flock size tend to support 
statements by many industry people and research workers that most of the large 
<lWner-integrated complexes are on the West Coast, in the South, and in the 
Northeast. 
An enumeration of egg-marketing agencies was made in 1966 in the eight 
southern States of Georgia, North Carolina, Arkansas, Alabama, South Carolina, 
Virginia, Tennessee, and Oklahoma. The 283 firms handling 400 cases or more 
1veekly handled about 66 percent of farm production of the eight States--nearly 
16 percent of U.S. output. Over three-fourths of the firms were either pro-
ducer-processors or processors, 8 percent were producers only, 7 percent con-
tractors, and 9 percent distributors. About half the 283 firms were in other 
businesses besides egg production or egg handling. Forty-two percent operated 
feed mills, 14 percent hatcheries, 5 percent poultry-dressing plants, and 
7 percent 'other businesses, such as selling started pullets and running retail 
feed stores and farm supply stores (.2_, p. 3). Of particular interest is the 
!!Xtent of integration of input-supplying with production and processing. 
Data from the 1966 study were used to derive the estimates in table 41. 
Whi lc tht~ estimates may be only approximate, they do suggest the large and 
probab I y growing importance of whol1 y owned flocks as a source of eggs for 
large firms. These pstimates may also suggest that wholly owned flocks may be 
growing relatively faster than contract flocks as a supply source. In fact, 
such flocks may be replacing contract production in some areas. 
The development and extension of large owner-integrated complexes and 
contract production seem to be associated with a high rate of expansion of egg 
production. Such a rate of expansion has occurred in the Pacific Coast States 
and in the South, as well as in a few States in other areas. 
The relative importance of cooperatives in various regions is not as 
clearly identified with relative increases or decreases in regional egg 
production (table 40). Cooperatives sold larger shares of regional egg pro-
duction in the North Atlantic and Western regions than elsewhere in 1962-66. 
Production in the former region has declined since the mid-1950's, while in 
the latter region it has risen. Thus, the effect of cooperatives in egg-
handling operations has probably been overshadowed by other factors. 
[ah :l 'd. -Pc'!"u:cn lJgt: di-,tributlon of egg m.:uketer.-, ::.uppl ies fr, 1m wholl v ,1wned 
dnd contract flock::., selected States, 1966 
Gecrg1<1 .. · ....... . 
~orth Carolina ... : 
South Carolina ... : 
VHginia ......... : 
'ennessee ·· ...... : 
A l db a!'la • • • • • • • • • • : 
Arkansas 
Oklahumd ......... : 
8 States 
----------
Percentage of total eggs to egg marketers from--
----- ---------·---------- ----
Own f] ucks Contract flod s 
---- ---·---- ------·----
Percent Percent 
43.9 19.2 
39.5 16.0 
50.8 18.4 
3!i. 6 9.5 
46.6 33.6 
37.4 35.5 
40.] 37.0 
18.0 28.7 
41.2 25.8 
---------
Tot<.~l 
Percent 
h3.l 
55.5 
6'1.2 
46.1 
80.2 
72.9 
87.1 
46.7 
67.0 
Source: Derived from data in Buck, J. T., "Survey of Cgg ;.1arketing Agencies 
in 8 Southern s·.1tes," Va. Polyt. lnst., D.A.E. Res. Rpt., Feb. 1968. Numbers 
nf firms mul til : t eJ by midpo1nts uf frequency intervals ;md accumulated to 
d<- r i vc .1bove ec; t imd u~s. 
Several new cooperative-type organizations were organized in the middle 
.md ld.te 19hO's. rhese were mainly c.onc<·rned with markvt information, market 
stabUizatHm, and bargain1ng activities rather than '>lith the more traditional 
pdcking and distributing activities in which most old~r cooperativ~s were 
engdged. In 19fl6-67, one nevJ organ1zation, operating in the South, represented 
about one-third of egg production there. Another reprPsented about one-fourth 
u! New England table egg production. A third organization represented 70 to 
75 percent of egg production 1n Southern California and Arizona. These organi-
zations, plus others like them in the East, Midwest, and Pacific areas, joined 
together ln a nationwide federation in 1968. By mid-1969, the federated coop-
erative claimed to represent 35 percent of producers and 50 percent of commer-
Cia' .:gg production in the United States. 'Hany individuals and firm members 
are engaged in packing and distributing, but the overall federation is not. 
Rather, its functions are an extension of those that concerned the individual 
organizations before they joined the federation. 
EXTERNAL FACTORS AND REGIONAL SHIFTS IN EGG PRODUCTION 
Several external factors have affected the egg industry along with all 
other industries. These factors may have substantially influenced the direction 
and rate of development of the egg Lndustry within vanous regions. 
tur'"> 
To date, it has not been 
nn capital availability. 
readily available to the 
has occurred. 
possible to develop any good statistical 1nJ1 -t-
Hc,,,,ever, it is dpparent that caoital must ha -
egg 1ndustrv in those: regions wL;;re rapid t--Xp 
Horcover, an area like the Hidwest, which de n·ased in importance in eF;,.: 
production during the 1950's and 1960's, wou1d require substantial comm1tment' 
nf capital to undertake an industry moderniza.t ion program. ~1any Pxist iniO; 
{~cilities might have to be written off, even though they may not yet be ful:, 
depreciated. Confidence in the profitability of egg production and supportin~ 
activities would certainly have to be increased hefore capital would be made 
available. 
Investors and lenders might examine: (1) the comparative prospects Jf 
individual enterprises within an area; and (2) the area's avera ll future pros-
pects for egg production or other business endeavors. The comparative perform-
ances of different regions in the recent past could be considered by lend~rs, 
makLng it more difficult for declining areas to obtain capital than for exrand1ng 
1reas to do so. 
Other Poultry Industries 
examination of reginna1 trends in cash receipts (deflated by pric,, level~) 
frnm egg and poultry production reveal significant contrasts (table 42). Cash 
ren·ipts from eggs have declined in tllE' North Atlantic region and the t-1idwest 
d.nd incrE>ased in the South and West. 
Cash receipts from broiler~ and farm chjckcns have increased slightly in 
tlw North Atlantic region since 1955, but this rt.'flects growth localized in a 
f,_.w States. Receipts have declined in the :-fidwest and increased moderately in 
the West and substantially in the South. Cash rec<~ipts from turkey enterprise" 
hd'/e increased in all regions except the North Atlantic since 1955. 
Thus egg, chicken, and turkey production have all been attractive dlter-
natives in the South and West. In the South, experience with integrated 
production of broilers has been increasingly adapted to egg and turkey produc-
t ion. The· area has also had the advantage, in expanding egg and turkey 
pwduction, of external economies available from institutions involved in thE:' 
large and efficient broiler industry. The rise of the West, particularly 
California, in egg production is based on large unit ~ize and efficiency within 
the industry itself. The Xi.dwest has evidently had"' better competitive position 
rm turkeys than on eggs or broilers. Hence, the turkey industry there has growr, 
while the egg and broiler industries have shrunk. 
The agri cui tural sector ha"> grown in all regions but the North At]anti<' 
since 1955, based on cash receipts deflated by price levels. ~ajor liv~stock 
enternrises have grown r0nsiderab1y in all but the North At lant i< and Fa<;t 
'l•>rth C~ntral region.,. :!ud1 of the gro'6'th has been in cattle and (ci]Ve~. in 
r~spons~ to increas~d clpmund tor h~ef ' 
T ah 1 e t+2.- ·-Cas !1 !nrm rt·cei pts f ror.; selected poultry enterprises, by region, 
selected years 1/ 
-··---·--·--------·--··----· -------
East West 
Pr•.)di!Ct and year North North North South South Western 
.Atlantic Central Central .Atlantic Central 
-------------- -------
Hill ion dollars 
Eggs: 
1955 .......... : 39 7 287 354 165 16 7 217 
1960 ............ 361 267 317 266 234 252 
19 ()() ........... 325 248 247 400 389 287 
1%7 ............ 332 256 227 440 461 303 
Broilers .<md farm: 
cl!Lcke.ns: 
Ji;J 55 ............. 133 80 59 263 158 59 
1960 ........... 142 68 49 478 370 74 
l9b6 ........... 142 50 40 715 681 99 
19117 ............ 148 49 42 732 700 110 
Turkeys: 
1955 ....... . .. 24 36 70 36 23 68 
1960 ............ 18 50 117 30 36 97 
1966 ........... 22 70 154 67 70 119 
19 6 7 ....... . . . . 23 70 169 75 90 133 
: 
-------- ------------------~-~ 
l/ Receipts are dollar receipts deflated by average farm prices. 
[n all regions, deflated total cash from crops has i11creased since 1955. 
ii·>Wt>Ver, the rate of i.ncrvase has been less in the South than els('wher(~. TlH· 
rr;ason fur this becomes obvious upon consideration of groupings uf majur crops 
like corn, whe<1t, soybeans, cnttun, and tobacco, and a few enterprises highly 
important to particular regions. In the South, cotton and tobacco income has 
been stabilizing and declining, \vhile income for major ~idwestern and Plains 
area crops--corn, soybeans, and wheat--has been holding up and even increasing. 
Hence, the South has found egg and poultry enterprises a desirable 
al ternaUve. On the other hand, the ~!idwest, except in the case of turkey 
production, has found other alternatives more attractive than eggs and poultry. 
i:{_<J_g_'"_Rates and Er~r_lovment 
Employment in manufacturing has risen a third or better in the South and 
Wt:-st since 1955, about a fifth in the West :>orth Central region, less in the 
East North Central region, and hardly at all in the North Atlantic region. 
During the same period, manufacturing wage rates have risen more than 50 percent 
in all regi(ms. But these changes have not yet become a critical influence. 
Absolute gains in manufacturing wage rates were significantly less in t!H.· South 
tn:m el',ewlwrt:, "?.r:,: St.•'lthenl "ag<· rat<'S in manufacturing are still well below 
thost:" in ,Jtht~r re)l.i.ms. 
Farm wage rates have also shown material gains in all re~ions since lll') 
Tht> rerc:entage increase for 1955-67 ranged from J5 per..:en.t or Lrlvre in the .'h< 
west to about 45 percent or more in the Western and North Atlantic regions 
However, farm wage rates in the South rose 70 to 75 percent during the samt> 
period. The absolute gains were 35 to 37 cents an hour in the :1idwest, and 
!,:+ to <i7 cents an hour in other regions. Hence, farm wage rates in tite Sout; 
:lespite the larger percentage increases, are still substantially below those 
~ther areas and remain an advantage to the South in terms of production inpu· 
cos t·s. 
By 1967, farm wage rates in the South were equal to a larger percentage Jl 
IDilnufacturing wage rates than in 1955. In other regions, farm wage rates were 
equal to a lower percentage of manufacturing wage rates than they had been in 
1955. Thus, farm employment in the South has not become as unattractive on a 
relative basis as it has elsewhere. 
Rising farm wage rates, as well as more off-farm movement due to grt:ater 
recognition of the spread between farm and off-farm wages, will tend to promote 
more mechanization and fewer and larger units in egg production. The Western 
and Southern industries are already further along in these respects than that 
in the Midwest. Thus, higher Southern wage rates would be only a partial 
deterrent to further expansion, unless the Midwest became equally efficient. 
FUTURE DEVELOPMEt\TS 
BAsed on projections of trends since the mid-1950's, further, gradual 
declines would be expected in the shares of total P.S. production from the 
North Atlantic region and the Midwest. The shares coming from the South would 
increase, corr~spondingly, hut at a lower rate than since the mid-1950's. The 
Western region's share would increase slightly, then level off. Gains would b~ 
more noticeable in the shares that the South and the West would have of total 
volume of eggs going to breaking plants. The share of the :vlidwest would 
decLine. These projections assume that a higher pt:rcentage of total egg output 
•..:uuld he used for breaking in the South and West and a 1 ower percentage in the 
Midwest than at present. 
Under these project ions, the ~!idwest would not recover its former position 
as the only major source of eggs for deficit regions. And unless there are 
rapid developments to1vard greater unit size and overall efficiencv, more coor-
dination, and more orderly marketing, the :1idwest will lose more ground. So 
long as other agricultural enterprises offer better prospects, there will be 
little reason for a lvidespread shift to eggs in the :1idwest. The ;udwest 
surplus would go mainly toward the Northeast. 
The !'llUth's egg industry, producing a larger surplus of eggs, would compt•t<: 
primarily with eggs from the Midwest in the ~ortheast, and with eggs from tla~ 
West in the Southwest and ~tountain areas. However, the rate o! Pxpansion in 
the South would decelerate. The South v.10uld have a substantial hn:•aking 
industrv, and except on the fringes \.Jherf' it borders U1e :<lidwp<;t, W(luld hreaf 
nost eggs not going tu tahle egg outlets. 
The Pacific area would take care of its own needs and fill much of the 
deficit needs in the Southwest and Hountain areas, with the \~estern industry, 
despite some disadvantages, remaining large, efficient, and aggressive. But 
some areas further east would become less important as outlets for that region. 
The Northeast's production would remain deficit overall, but the region 
wil1 support a substantial and efficient local industry. New England would 
take care of its own remaining brown-egg preference. On white eggs, however, 
t.he South and Midwest would make up the deficit. 
Predictions about the future position of various regions in the egg 
business are hazardous at best. It is easy to locate factors which may have 
explained past developments, but difficult to give them precise weightings. 
Also, the role of individuals and institutions is difficult to appraise. The 
decisions and ability of entrepreneurs will be important in influencing further 
developments, and administrative and political decisions could have major 
effects. In addition, there may be new factors, as yet unidentified, which 
would make predictions based on past trends highly questionable. Additional 
studies, involving alternative sets of assumptions, ma.v offer better indications 
of what the future holds. 
COMMERCIAl EGG MARKETING CHANNELS 
LATE 1950 S 
lATE 1960 S 
BI!EMERS 
1\0) 
RETAILERS iiiSTITUTlOII~ 88 ClOKSUIIERS BUYERS(~> (!10) 
s 
III!EAKERS 
(10) 
RETAILERS. 
INSTITUT10RAL 8 8 
BUYERS(IIl 
7 
* Plt/ICIEHTACI 01' U S P~ODVCTIOH I:XCLIIIIIHC ICGS VSI:C> FOR HATCHING 
/UPOU .OlD COHIV"P T/OH OH I'A/IMS 
COHSUIIERS 
(90) 
U S. DEPARTMENT 0~ AGRICULTURE H!G !II$ UU·69 (!I ECOHOMIC •IIIA.RQO IIR,ICI! 
1able '1.--Annu<<l 3urplus and def1c1t 1n egg product1on, by region, selected 
years 
Region 
Surplus (+) or deficit (-) of egg production in-- 11 
1950 1955 : 1960 1963 : 1966 1967 : 1968 
12000 cases 
Nt..>W Engldnd . - 2,269 - 2,269 - 2' 69 4 - 1,997 - 1,858 - 2,061 - 2,017 ....... 
t1tddle Atlantic .. :-11,014 - 9,200 -11, 139 -12,514 -14, 108 -15,122 -15,647 
1 ast Norlh Central:+ l, 30 3 419 - 3,444 - 5,566 - 8, 2B1 - 8, 839 - 9,028 
: 
West North Centrd1 :+'37,156 +31,742 +28,469 +21 ,039 +16,461 +16,225 +13,242 
Soulh Atlantic ·- 8, 956 - 9.667- 4,369 + 300 + 3,519 + 5' 369 + 5' 895 
r ast South Central:- 1,575 - 2 '336 - 250 + 2 '377 + 4,205 + 5,506 + 5,619 
West South Central:- 911 - 4,994 - 4,253 - 2,450 - 211 + 953 + 1,244 
l'lountain . " ......... 406 - 1,625 - 2,389 - 2,786- 3,050 - 3,139 - 3' 136 
!'acific .......... :- 1,983 997 + 1,086 + 2,947 + 3,825 + 4,208 + 4,686 
·--------
)) Assumes uniform per Cdpi ta consumption in all regions. 
